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ALIENS-NATRALIZATION-ERRONEOUS SPECIFICATION OF SOVEREIGN-ORDER
NUNC PRO TuNc-An application for citizenship was made by a supposed German
subject. Section 3 of the Naturalization Act of June 25, igio, requires a
declarant to express the intention "to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity
to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly by name,
to the prince, potentate, state or sovereignty of which the alien may be at the
time a citizen or subject." The declarant in the principal case, after the general
renunciatory clause, renounced allegiance particularly to "William II, Emperor
of Germany." At the hearing it appeared that the petitioner was a French
citizen. By an order nunc pro tunc the words "French Republic" were sub-
stituted for "William II, etc." and citizenship was thereupon decreed. The
United States brought a petition to cancel the certificate of naturalization.
Held, that the petition should be allowed, because the nunc pro tunc order and
final decree were erroneous. United States v. Vogel (Dec. io, I919) C. C. A.
2d, Oct. Term. i919, No. 29.
The function of a nunc pro tunc order in judicial proceedings is to bring
the record into conformity with the facts and not to supply retroactively a
missing fact. Liddell v. Landau (I9o8) 87 Ark. 438, 112 S. W. o85. Accord-
ingly courts have sometimes refused nunc pro tunc corrections of declarations
of intention in naturalization proceedings. In re Lewkowicr (19o9, S. D.
N. Y.) 169 Fed. 927. Contra, In re Markowitz (I916, E. D. Pa.) 233 Fed. 715;
United States v. Orend (1915, W. D. Pa.) 221 Fed 777. Such a correction
has been refused, much more questionably, even when the error was purely
clerical, the oral declaration itself having complied with legal requirements.
In re Hennig (1918, E. D. N. Y.) 248 Fed. 99o (error as to date of birth). The
2oo Fed. 330. On the other hand, a supplementary paper correcting an error
of the declarant not so material as to vitiate the final decree has been allowed.
In re Hennig (1918, E. D. N. Y.) 248 Fed. 990 (error as to date of birth.) The
decision in the principal case seems sound, insofar as it involves a reversal
of the nunc pro tunc order. The further holding that the specific renunciation
prescribed is an indispensable part of the declaration of intention can hardly
be criticised in view of the express language of the statute. See United States
v. Vogel, supra, 362, 363; cf. Ex parte Lange (1912, E. D. Mo.) 197 Fed. 769;
cf. In re Stack, supra. Inasmuch as the record in the case, barring the erroneous
nunc pro tunc order, disclosed German nationality, this would be sufficient to
support the decision under Comp. Stat. 1916, sec. 4352, the petition having been
filed subsequently to April 6, 1917. United States v. Meyer (1917, C. C. A. 2d)
241 Fed. 3o5. From the language- of the opinion, however, it is inferable that
the court regarded the petitioner's case as irremediable by any amendment of
the petition, oi by a new petition, with an averment of French citizenship. Such
a conclusion, based upon the ground that the declarant must decide at his peril
the identity of his allegiance, would be contrary to some well considered decisions.
Cf. United States v. Orend, supra; In re Denny (1917, S. D. N. Y.) 240 Fed.
845; cf. In re Markowitz, supra; cf. United States v. .Viaropulos (915, W. D.
Pa.) 221 Fed. 485. Contra, In re Friedl, supra; In re Lewkowicz, supra. The
specific renunciatory clause, prescribed by Congress in addition to the general
renunciation of allegiance, could serve no rational purpose except that of
additional specification. No legislative disposition to insist upon a correct
knowledge of the identity of the declarant's allegiance is indicated by the mere
fact that the specification is required. Cf. In re Denny, supra; cf. [tn re Hennig,
supra. Such a legislative intention is rendered the more improbable in view
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of the formidable legal difficulties so frequently involved in deciding between
conflicting claims of allegiance.
ALIENs-PHILosopHicAL ANlRCHlSTs-DPoRTATIoN.-The petitioner, an alien
philosophical anarchist, was heard before the immigration authorities and an
order for his deportation was issued under the Act of Congress of Feb. 5, 1917,
ch. 29, 39 Stat. L. 874, which _provides for the deportation of "any alien who at
any time after entry shall be found advocating or teaching . . . anarchy." It
appeared that petitioner did not believe in violence under any circumstances
but merely claimed the privilege, which he undertook to exercise, of propagating
through lectures the theory that society would be better off without government.
The petitioner applied for a writ of habeas corpus. Held, that the writ should
be denied since the order for deportation was proper. Lopez v. Howe (igig,
C. C. A. 2d) 259 Fed. 40I.
The petitioner was admitted by the court to belong to the "class of honest
and law-abiding visionaries, who are convinced that the interest of society
would be promoted by the abolition of all government whatsoever. Their
propaganda is purely educational in character and violence does not enter into
it." Yet, as Congress had made no discrimination between philosophers and
preachers of violence in describing "anarchists" subject to deportation, the court
felt constrained to affirm the order. There seems no doubt that every govern-
ment must have the privilege to preserve itself against disruptive agencies;
and the mores of the time must determine what such agencies are. Beliefs and
opinions not sufficiently in harmony with the mores, if deemed disruptive, must
perforce, it would seem, be suppressed although the penalizing of mere opinion
seems mediaeval. Difficulties in administration arise during transitional periods
of changing mores, when the agencies deemed disruptive grow in variety and
power. But if the oral teacher of philosophic anarchy is expelled-and this
would seem a defensible policy-must we not logically suppress the more power-
ful influence of the books of Proudhon, Tolstoi, Ferrer, Zola, Kropotkin, and
others by establishing an index expurgatorius? The privilege to exclude or
expel aliens considered deleterious to the public welfare is inherent in all
government. Fong Yue Ting v. United States (1893) 149 U. S. 698, 13 Sup.
Ct. ioi6. In the United States the grounds of exclusion and expulsion areprescribed by statute. Act of February 2o, 1907, 34 Stat. L. 898; February 5,
1917, 39 Stat. L. 874, Act of Oct. 16, 1918, Public No. 221, 65th Cong. The
same is true of Great Britain and Brazil. Great Britain, Aliens Act of 19o5,5 Edw. VII, ch. 13; Brazil, Law of January 7, 19o7, (19o8) 4 Rev. de Droit Int.
Privi, 855, U. S. For. Rel. 19o7, I, 113. While the terms of the statutes are
broad, most governments have not by enumeration of specific grounds limited
their freedom of action; for example, Italy, Germany, Roumania, etc. Martini,
L'Expulsion des itrangers (Paris, 19og) 42ff. The petitioner in the instant case
had resided in the United States fifteen years. In several countries a domiciled
alien cannot be expelled. Thus, in Belgium and Venezuela the domiciled alien
and in Brazil, the alien who has resided in the country two years, is exempt.
Belgium, Law of Feb. 12, 1897; "Halot, Traitg des itrangers en Belgique
(Bruxelles, 19oo) ; Brazil, Instructions of May 23, 19o7, in execution of the law
of Jan. 7, 19o7, (191o) 37 Clunet, 1377; Venezuela, Law of April 16, 1903, art.
6; Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (1915) sec. 27. Pos-
sibly these statutes may recently have been amended. Until ig1o the time for
deportation of undesirable aliens was limited in the United States to three
years after arrival. By the amendment of March 26, 1910, 36 Stat. L. 263,
alien prostitutes or those bringing in women for immoral purposes are deporta-
ble any time. United States v. Czeslicki (1913, M. D. Pa.) 209 Fed. 496. Bythe act of 1917 the period of limitation was removed from those advocating
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"anarchy." The grounds of expulsion have covered a wide range and include:
spreading socialistic propaganda (Jaurs case, Germany, 195o, 4 Moore's Dig.
69) ; promoting and organizing a strike (Ben Tillett case, Belgium, 1896, (1899)
26 Clunet, 203); practising the art of healing without a license (Edwards'
case, Belgium, 190, 4 Moore's Dig. 83) ; writings or speeches derogatory to the
government or the army (cases of Father Forbes in France, (1892) 19 Clunet,
405; Hottmann in Switzerland, (1894) 21 Clunet, 672; Kennan in Russia, 19O1,
4 Moore's Dig. 94), preaching polygamy (Mormon missionaries in Germany,
For. Rel. 1898, p. 347); anarchy (Kropotchine case in Switzerland (1882) 9
Clunet, a; United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams (1904) 194 U. S. 279,
24 Sup. Ct. 719) and many others. Attempts have been made by governments
to agree on uniform administrative measures for exercising surveillance over
anarchists. For. Rel. 19Ol, 196. Until the mores change, anarchists can not
expect toleration from organized governments. They are inherently unde-
sirable.
BAILMENTs-LzMITATION OF BAILEE'S LIAmliTY-Loss OF BAGGAGE IN CHECK
RooM.-A bill was filed to recover the sum of $224.50, the alleged value of a
suit-case and its contents, which the complainant deposited at the defendant's
check room in its station. The bag and its contents were given to another
person by mistake and had not been returned. The defence was that there was
a notice on the face of the check given to the complainant to the effect that
the defendant would not be responsible for an amount exceeding ten dollars
on any article covered by the check. Held, that the complainant should recover
the full value of the suit-caseand its contents. Dodge v. Nashville C. & St. L.
Ry. (1919, Tenn.) 215 S. W. 274.
The problem in the instant case is different from that in the usual case,
where the carrier, in conjunction with the ticket issued to each passenger,
allows a certain amount of baggage to be carried, for which a baggage check
is given limiting the liability of the carrier in case of loss. The weight of
authority in the latter cases is that the carrier cannot avoid or lessen its
responsibility by mere notice upon the check, unless the passenger's attention is
actually drawn to the limitation. Cooper v. Norfolk Southern R. R. (1913)
161 N. C. 400, 77 S. E. 339; Rawson v. Pennsylvania R. R. (1872) 48 N. Y. 212;
Browne, Law of Bailinents (i896) 191; see (1913) 23 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 95;
(1916) 26 ibid., 414. In the instant case the carrier was not acting in the
regular capacity of a carrier, but in the capacity of a bailee for hire, and as such
could limit its liability, provided the bailor had actual knowledge and assented.
But the defendant contended that the printed notice on the check was binding
whether the passenger read it or not. Such is the rule in England. Harris v.
Great Western Ry. (1876) I Q. B. D. 515; Pratt v. South Eastern R. R. [1897]
i Q. B. 718. The cases on this point are rare in the United States. Where a
check was given at a check room with a printed notice thereon, limiting liability
to ten dollars, it has been held insufficient notice and the full amount was
recovered. Healy v. New York Central & H. R. R. (1912, Sup. Ct.) 153 App.
Div. 516, 138 N. Y. Supp. 287; contra, Terry v. Southern Ry. (1908) 81 S. C. 279,
62 S. E. 249. The suit in the instant case was brought in equity under a
Tennessee statute. Shannon's Code (Thompson ed. 1918) sec. 6Iop.
BANKRUPTcY-PRoPERTY ACQUmED BY TRUSTEE-FoRFEITURE OF LEAs.-A
coal lease provided for forfeiture and reEntry upon breach of conditions, such
as the payment of royalties, taxes, etc. The lessee corporation failed to comply
with these conditions and subsequently it was adjudged an involuntary bankrupt.
Demand was made on the trustee in bankruptcy, who refused to perform the
covenants in the lease. The lessors thereupon declared the lease forfeited
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and reentered the premises and the trustee peaceably surrendered possession.
He then filed a petition seeking an order to restrain the lessors from enforcing
the forfeiture. Held, that the trustee was not entitled to relief. In re Elk
Brook Coal Co. (igig, D. Pa.) 44 Am. B. Rep. 283.
Under section 7oa of the Bankruptcy Act a trustee takes "title" to a lease
held by the bankrupt only in case he elects to accept it within a reasonable time
after his appointment. If he does not elect to accept, the lease remains the
property of the bankrupt. In. re Frazer (igio, C. C. A. 1st) 183 iFed. 28. In
such case the bankrupt continues to be liable on his covenant for the payment
of rent, taxes, royalties, etc., accruing after the petition in bankruptcy, the
landlord's right arising from such covenants not being a provable claim within
section 63a of the act. It re Roth & Appel (1gio, C. C. A. 2d) 181 Fed. 667.
See Hine, The Effect of Failure to Perform Contracts Made Prior to Receiver-
ship (1914) 24 YALE LAW JOURNAL, III, I19. It is within the discretion of the
trustee whether to accept or reject a lease burdened with obligations. It re
Cogley (1goi, D. Iowa) io7 Fed. 73. If he elects to accept, he takes subject to
all claims and defects existing at the time of adjudication. Chattanooga National
Bank v. Rome (igoo, C. C. N. D. Ga.) i Fed. 755. The vital question presented
in the principal case is whether or not the adjudication in bankruptcy operated
to prevent the lessors from exercising their power to enforce a forfeiture as
provided by the terms of the lease. It has been held that where notice of
forfeiture is served before the adjudication, the bankruptcy court will by decree
enforce the forfeiture and order the trustee to surrender the property. Lindeke
v. Associates Realty Co. (i9o6, C. C. A. 8th) 146 Fed. 63o. The same rule would
seem to apply even though the power were not exercised until after the adjudica-
tion, and the principal case appears sound, especially in view of the fact that
the trustee's peaceful surrender of the property might well be treated as an
election on his part to reject the leasehold.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IPAMENT OF COxTRACT-EFEcT OF .STATE STATUTE
ON MUNICIPAL FRANcHIsE CONTAcr7-The defendant street railway accepted the
terms of a municipal franchise ordinance passed in i9o2 and agreed to sell work-
ing people half-fare tickets good on all cars during certain hours. State "anti:
pass" legislation of 19o7 forbade all such discrimination. The defendant then
refused to carry out its agreement. This bill was brought by the city to obtain
a mandatory injunction. Held, that the bill should be dismissed. Dubuque
Electric Co. v. City of Dubuque (1919, C. C. A. 8th) 26o Fed. 253.
It is well established that a city may have the power to make valid franchise
contracts. Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co. (i9o6) 2o6 U. S. 496, 27
Sup. Ct. 762; Cleveland v. Cleveland City Ry. (19o4) 194 U. S. 512, 24 Sup. Ct.
756. And even increased war costs may not justify the public utility in refusing
to perform. Columbus Ry. Power & Light Co. v. City of Columbus (1919) 249
U. S. 399, 39 Sup. Ct. 349; (1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 826. Nor may the
city disregard its duties arising from the contract. Vicksburg Waterworks Co.
v. Vicksburg (1904) 202 U. S. 453, 26 Sup. Ct. 661. It might seem that Article
I, section io of the federal Constitution would prevent any impairment of such
contracts by state action. But a municipal corporation is merely a political
sub-division of the state. Covington v. Kentucky (1899) 173 U. S. 231, 19 Sup.
Ct. 383; East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co. (185% U. S.) 1o How. 511. Its
rights and duties, etc., arising from contracts therefore may be changed at the
will of the state. City of Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas Co. (1919, U. S.)
39 Sup. Ct. 526. In such case, however, the assent of the other contracting
party must be obtained or the state law may be invalid as an impairment of
contract. Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy (1867, U. S.) 4 Wall. 535. The con-
stitutional difficulty in the principal case is usually avoided, however, by holding
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that the contract was made with an implied reservation in favor of the proper
exercise by the state of its police power. Sioux City Street Ry. v. Sioux City
(189) 138 U. S. 98, II Sup. Ct. 226. Cf. In re Searsport Water Co. (I919,
Me.) io8 Atl. 452. The state may on that ground annul contracts between a
public utility and its patron where the contract rate has become unreasonable.
Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Public Service Corporation (i919) 248 U. S.
372, 39 Sup. Ct. 117. And the public utility has been allowed in such case to
refuse performance on its own initiative. V. & S. Bottle Co. v. Momtain Gas
Co. (1918) 261 Pa. 523, 1O4 Ati. 667. But if the utility is to be considere.d to
have contracted regarding its rates, it would seem the contract duty should be
binding until the state has acted. Manitowoc v. Manitowoc & Northern Trac-
tion Co. (911) 145 Wis. 13, 129 N. W. 925. The decision in the principal case
is clearly sound on either of the two grounds.
CONTRACTs-TEIRD PARTY BENEFICIA Y-MATERIALMEN'S BoNDs.-A state
statute required contractors with municipalities to execute a bond for the
payment of all subcontractors and materialmen. The contractor demanded a
bond from his subcontractor, which was issued with the defendant company as
surety, reciting that it was as provided by the above statute and was for the
benefit of materialmen and others. The plaintiff furnished materials to the
subcontractor for which it was never paid. It then sued the defendant surety
who contended that the plaintiff should not recover because it was not a sub-
contractor. Held, that the plaintiff should not recover. Carolina Portland
Cement Co. v. Carey & Boettner (1919, La.) 82 So. 887.
The court held that the bond was not required by the above mentioned
statute, and that hence the question was one of construction of a common law
bond. By the Code of Louisiana a third party beneficiary to a contract can
recover. Civil Code of La. Art. 19o2. And the trend of authority seems to
favor recovery by materialmen on such bonds. Cf. Builders Lumber & Supply
Co. v. Chicago Bonding & Surety Co. (1918) 167 Wis. 167, 166 N. W. 320;
cf. Allen & Currey Mfg. Co. v. Shreveport Waterworks Co. (i9o5) 113 La.
1091, 37 So. 98a; see also COMMENT (1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 798. But
the court in the instant case reasoned that the bond must be construed strictissilni
juris, and that since it referred to the statute, the intention was that the plain-
tiff should not be protected by it. It seems well settled, however, that this rule
does not apply to bonds written by surety and insurance companies. Their
bonds, like contracts of insurance, are to be construed against them. United
States v. Lynch (1912, D. Del.) 192 Fed. 364; American Surety Co. v. Pauly
(898) 170 U. S. 133, i8 Sup. Ct. 552; see COMMENT (1917) 26 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 320; (1918) 28 ibid., 193. And in view of the fact that the bond
expressly bound the defendant in favor of "all subcontractors under said sub-
contractors" and of "furnishers of- materials," it would seem to include the
plaintiff in its terms. Hence the plaintiff should have been allowed to recover
as third party beneficiary. The mention of the statute in the bond only tends
to show that the parties thought they were legally bound to make the bond.
That they had . misinterpreted the statute would seem to be an insufficient
reason for overriding the express terms of the bond as against one who
thereafter furnished materials to the principal.
DAMAGEs-DECLINE IN VALUE OF StoCm DURING LITIGATION.--The plaintiff
sued the defendant to set aside a sale of bank stock as fraudulently made to
defeat execution on their judgment against the transferor. During the litigation
the stock declined in value. The transfer was set aside and the proceeds from
the sheriff's sale were less than they would have been had the stock been sold
at the beginning of the suit. The plaintiff then brought this action to recover
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the resulting loss. Held, that he should not recover. Clivier v. Majors (1919,
La.) 83 So. 23.
The Louisiana law provides that where the transfer of the debtor's property
to a third person to defeat judgment creditors is simulated or fictitious, the
creditor can immediately seize the property so conveyed without suing to annul
the transfer. Gaidry v. Lyons (1877) 29 La. Ann. 4. But where there has
been an actual transfer of the property, as in the instant case, the creditor must
sue to annul it. Johnson v. Kingsland and Ferguson Mfg. Co. (1886) 38 La.
Ann. 248. In most jurisdictions, in such case, the creditor has concurrent
remedies in law and equity. See 2o Cyc. 655, note 79. He may bring a creditor's
bill to have the transfer set aside. Planters and Merchants' Bank v. Walker
(1845) 7 Ala. 926; Sullickson v. Madsen (1894) 87 Wis. 19, 57 N. W. 965.
Or he may enforce a lien on the property or levy execution thereon as though
title were still in the debtor. Jackson v. Holbrook (1887) 36 Minn. 494, 32 N. W.
852; Smith v. Reid (1892) 134 N. Y. 568, 31 N. E. 1O82. He can thus obtain
immediate benefit of the property. Where he has his choice of remedies and
brings suit to set aside the conveyance, he should not be heard to complain
that he suffered a loss through the decline in value of the property, because he
elected to take the slower procedure. But in the present case the plaintiff had
no such choice. His only remedy was to pursue the revocatory action, which
forced him to delay till the suit was settled, and had to bear the resulting loss.
In this respect, the law in Louisiana does not seem to give the creditor as
adequate a remedy as that of the other jurisdictions.
DAMAGES-PERSONAL INJuRIEs-Loss OF EARNING POWER-PROITS FROM
Busr=ms-The plaintiff sued the defendant for personal injuries. The plain-
tiff was engaged in the tea and coffee business in which he employed three
clerks and had a moderate wagon trade. Proof of a decrease of profits in the
business was admitted to show the plaintiff's loss of earning capacity. Held,
that such admission was error. Dempsey v. the City of Scranton (igig, Pa.)
lO7 Aft. 877.
The plaintiff's husband was a wagon builder and employed four or five
workmen and a minor son, but had no capital invested in his business except
in tools and material. A suit was brought for his wrongful death after he
had been killed in a railroad accident. Evidence was admitted that the decedent
had set aside $i,8oo from profits each year for the support of his family.
Held, that this was not error, since the decedent was engaged in a business
predominatingly personal. Baxter v. Philadelphia and Reading R. R. (1919, Pa.)
lO7 At]. 881.
The courts distinguish between businesses involving the investment of
capital and those depending primarily upon the personal activity of the owner.
Cf. Mahoney v. Boston Elevated Railway Co. (I9I5) 221 Mass. 116, loS N. E.
1033, (1915) 25 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 83. In the former, profits derived from the
business can not be shown as a measure of earning power. Pryor v. Metropoli-
tan Street Railway Co. (9oo) 85 Mo. App. 367. In this class of cases, proof of
decrease in earnings is admissible, but the courts limit earnings to the money
received for services performed. Cf. Chicdgo; Rock Island and Pacific R. R. v.
Stubbs (i9o6) I7 Okla. 97, 87 Pac. 293. The first of the principal cases falls in
this class and is in line with the general rule. The second of the principal
cases represents a modification of this rule. Evidence of profits may be admitted
where the element of personal earnings predominates in the business over the
investment of an insignificant capital. Kronold v. City of New York (1go6)"
186 N. Y. 40, 78 N. E. 572 (business depending on orders for Swiss embroider-
ies) ; Fraser v. the City of Buffalo (19o8) 123 App. Div. 159, io8 N. Y. Supp.
127 (merchant tailor employed workmen by the piece to make clothes cut out
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by him). The decision in each case depends upon the nature of the business and
whether the predominating factor in the business is the directing or the physical
and intellectual labor of the individual. In the following cases evidence of
profits was excluded because of the amount of capital invested. Weir v. Union
Ry. (19o7) 188 N. Y. 416, 81 N. E. 1178 (small restaurant or lunch business) ;
Goinbert v. New York Central & H. R. R. (1909) 195 N. Y. 273, 88 N. E. 382
(building contractor employing at times both material and labor); York v.
City of Everton (i9o6) 121 Mo. App. 64A, 97 S. W. 6o4 (plaintiff engaged in
millinery business). The second of the principal cases seems to take a liberal
view of what constitutes a business predominatingly personal.
GiFss-REvocATIoN-BY FATHER AS NATURAL GUARDIAN.-A father opened
separate bank accounts in the names of his four minor children and made
deposits on the accounts during a period of several years. He communicated
this fact to the children and showed the pass books to 'them. Two of the
children testified that they occasionally had the pass books in their possession,
but it did not appear that they ever exercised any control over them. The
father drew out the money without the knowledge of the children and loaned
it to the president of the bank, taking his individual notes, payable to the
children, which notes were never paid. One of the children brought an action
against the bank to recover the amount which had been deposited in his name.
Held, that he should recover, the bank having paid the money to the father
without authority. McKinnon v. First National Bank of Pensacola (igig, Fla.)
82 So. 748.
When one deposits money in the name of another with the intention to make
a gift, it is not necessary for the completion of the gift that the depositor turn
the pass book over to the donee. Meriden Trust and Safe Deposit Co. v. Miller
(1914) 88 Conn. 157, 9o Atl. 228; Blasdel v. Locke (1872) 52 N. 
H. 238. Some
act of acceptance by the donee is necessary, such as communication to 
and
acquiescence by him. Roughan v. Chenango Valley Spring Bank (1913, Sup.
Ct.) 158 App. Div. 786, 144 N. Y. Supp. 508; Beaver v. Beaver (1889) 117 N. Y.
421, 22 N. E. 94o. These requirements were fulfilled in the principal case 
and
were re~nforced by the rule that a transaction between father and child will
be construed as gift upon the slightest evidence. Jones v: Jones (1918, Mo.
App.) 2o S. W. 557; Love v. Francis (1886) 63 Mich. 181, 29 N. W. 
843.
Once having made the gift, it was not within the power of the father 
to
extinguish the bank's debt without the consent of the children. As natural
guardian, the father has a right to the custody of his child. Matter of Galleher
(igo5) 2 Calif. App. 364, 84 Pac. 352; lain. v. Priest (1917) 30 Ida. 273, 164
Pac. 364. In fact, a contract by which the father releases to another 
the
custody of his child is revocable at the parent's election. In. re Galleher, supra.
But this right to the custody of the child's person is the limit of natural
guardianship. The relation confers- no control over the child's property.
Vineyard v. Heard (1914, Tex. Civ. App.) 167 S. W. 22; Ringstad v. Hanson
(1911) 150 Iowa, 324, 13o N. W. 145. The decision in the principal 
case would
seem amply justified inasmuch as the bank had full notice of the children's
interest in the bank accounts.
INTERSTATE CommERcE-GoVERNMENT CONTROL OF 
TELEGRAPH LiNEs-
LIABILITY FOR UNREPEATED MESSAGES.-The defenda nt by contract with the
sender limited its responsibility for missending an unrepeated message. 
An
error was made in the transmission and this action was brought by the 
plaintiff,
who sent the message, to recover damages under the state common law, 
which
held such contracts to be void. Held, that he should not recover, because 
such
contracts were beyond the control of the state. Postal Telegraph-Cable 
Co. v.
Warren-Godwin Luniber Co. (1919) 40 Sup. Ct. 69.
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This case, in accord with the weight of authority in the state courts, deter-
mines that by the Amendment of June 18, I9IO (36 Stat. L. 539) to the Com-
merce Act of 1887 all state regulation of the interstate transmission of telegraphic
messages which is inconsistent with the rules obtaining in the federal courts,
is suspended. See (1gig) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 831. The unrepeated message
from its very inception has been sent under a limited rate and subject to a
limited responsibility. Clay County Produce Co. v. Western Union (1917) 44
Int. Com. Rep. 67o. By this federal Act, express authority is given the company
to classify messages into "day, night, repeated and unrepeated-and to charge
reasonable rates for the different classes of messages." The power to establish
just rates carried with it the primary authority to provide a rate for unrepeated
telegrams, and also the power to fix a reasonable limitation of responsibility
where such rate was charged. Cf. Primrose v. Western Union (1894) 154 U. S.
I, 14 Sup. Ct. lO98. As pointed out in the instant case, this would seem to
indicate that Congress intended to control the whole field covering the regulation
of interstate telegrams. Western Union v. Lee (1917) 174 Ky. 210, 192 S. W.
70; contra, Western Union v. Boegli (1917, Ind.) 115 N. E. 773. This con-
clusion ii fortified by the fact that only through such an interpretation would
the uniformity and equality of rates contemplated by the Amendment be possible,
for otherwise such contracts would be subject to the control of conflicting state
laws. Hence it is submitted that the instant decision is not only in accord with
the intent and purpose of the Act, but also with the general tendency to com-
pletely liberate all subjects of interstate commerce from state interference. See
(1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 456.
JUDGMENTS-FuLL FAITH AND CREDIT-JUSRIuSrioN.--The plaintiff recovered
a judgment by default in Nebraska upon an insurance policy. A Nebraska
statute provided that any person who caused a policy to be issued or received,
and receipted for any payment thereon, should be deemed an agent of the
company. The present action was debt upon the Nebraska judgment. It
appeared in evidence that the defendant maintained its only office in Chicago;
that it had no paid solicitors, but policies were issued only upon the recom-
mendation and solicitation of its members; and that service in Nebraska was
made upon a member who had previously secured two policies in that state.
Held, that the plaintiff should not recover, because the Nebraska court did not
have jurisdiction in the former case. Pembleton v. Illinois Commercial Men's
Ass'n (1919, IIl) 1--4 N. E. 355,
It is well settled that the "full faith and credit" clause of the Constitution
does not preclude inquiry into the jurisdictional facts of a judgment. The
judgment may be attacked collaterally, either as to the jurisdiction of the
person or the subject-matter. Thompson v. Whitman (1873, U. S.) 18 Wall.
457; Simmons v. Saul (18go) 138 U. S. 439, II Sup. Ct. 369; National Exchange
Bank v. Wiley (19o4) 195 U. S. 257, 25 Sup. Ct. 7. The recital of jurisdic-
tional facts in the record shows only prima facie jurisdiction, and is open to
collateral attack. Thompson v. Whitman, supra. For a criticism and refinement
of this rule, see COMMENT (1919) .28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 579. A state may
provide, as a condition precedent to doing business within its borders, that a
corporation must consent to service upon its agent in the state as equivalent
to service on the corporation. A judgment based on such service is entitled
to full faith and credit. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French (1855, U. S.) 18 How.
404; Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Phelps (I9O2) 190 U. S. 147, 23 Sup.
Ct. 707. For such statutes to confer jurisdiction, it must appear that the cor-
poration was doing business within the state. Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass'n
v. McDonough (19o6) 204 U. S. 8, 27 Sup. Ct. 236; Commercial Mutual Acci-
dent Co. v. Davis (199o) 213 U. S. 245, 29 Sup. Ct. 445; Connecticut Mut. Life
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Ins. Co. v. Spratley (1899) 172 U. S. 602, 19 Sup. Ct. 308. Although the result
in the principal case works a hardship on the policy holders, it is in accord with
the authorities. The question of jurisdiction was before the court, and the
Nebraska statute could not control because the appellant was found not to be
doing business within that state.
JUDGMENTS-STARE DECISis-REs JUDICATA-LAW OF THE CAsE.-The plaintiff
purchased an automobile from a retail dealer and was injured by the collapse
of a defective wheel. He sued the manufacturer and secured a large judgment.
On the first appeal, the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court
and held that since there was no contractual relationship between the parties,
there was no "liability." On the second appeal, the identical case, cause of
action, and parties again came before the same court. Held, that the plaintiff
should recover. Ward, J., dissenting. Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co. (I919,
C. C. A. 2d) October Term 1919, No. 20.
The doctrine of stare decisis is that when a court has once laid down a prin-
ciple as applicable to a certain state of facts it will adhere to that principle and
apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same. Cf.
Moore v. City of Albany (1885) 98 N. Y. 396; cf. Menge v. The Madrid (1889,
C. C. E. D. La.) 40 Fed. 677. However, it is well settled that courts are privi-
leged to depart from this doctrine when it is necessary to do so in order to
prevent the perpetuation of a palpable error. Calhoun Gold Mining Co. v.
Ajax Gold Mining Co. (1899) 27 Colo. I, 59 Pac. 607; Pitcock v. State (igog)
91 Ark. 527, 121 S. W. 742; see COMMENT (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 668.
The doctrine of res judicata is that when a final judgment has been rendered
on the merits of a cause of action, by a. competent tribunal, it cannot be litigated
again by the same parties. Cf. Williainsburgh Savings Bank v. Town of Solon
(1893) 136 N. Y. 465, 32 N. E. io58; cf. Mitchell v. First Natl. Bk. of Chicago
(190) I8o U. S. 471, 21 Sup. Ct. 418; cf. Sly v. Hunt (1893) 159 Mass. 151,
34 N. E. 187. Res judicata has reference to the facts of a case. See Sawyer
v. Woodbury (1856) 73 Mass. 499, 502; see Citizens' Bank v. Brigham (igoo)
61 Kan. 727, 731, 6o Pac. 754, 755. While stare decisis has reference to the legal
principle involved. See Oliver Co. v. Louisville Realty Co. (1913) 156 Ky. 628,
640, 161 S. W. 570, 575; see It re Preisers Will (1913, Surr. Ct.) 79 Misc. 668,
671, 14o N. Y. Supp. 844, 846. The doctrine of res judicata could not be
invoked in the instant case as no final judgment had ever been entered. But
by the great weight of authority, all questions which were decided by a court
of final resort on the first appeal become the law of the case and are not sub-
ject to review on the second appeal. McKinney v. State (1888) 117 Ind. 26,
19 N. E. 613; City of Hastings v. Foxworthy (1895) 45 Neb. 676, 63 N. W.
955. The instant case in holding that this rule is not inexorable, is in accord
with some authority. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Merrill (1902) 65 Kan. 436,
70 Pac. 358; sei Bird v. Sellers (1894) 122 Mo. 23, 32, 26 S. W. 668, 670. It
is submitted to be sound. For when a palpably erroneous .doctrine has been
established on the former appeal and the appellate court is convinced that
the evils of adherence to it are manifestly greater than those of departure, it
would seem that the sensible-thing to do is to correct the error at the first
opportunity. For a discussion of an automobile manufacturer's liability to
third parties, see (1916) 25 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 679.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-COVENANT NOT TO SUBLET-ASSIGNmENT.-A leased
his premises to B. The lease contained a covenant not to sublet, but no covenant
forbidding an assignment. B assigned his lease to the defendant, who took
possession. The plaintiff purchased the premises from A and, during the term
prescribed by the lease, brought an action of unlawful detainer. Held, that the
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action must fail because an assignment was not a breach of the covenant against
subletting. Goldman v. Daniel Feder & Co. (igig, W. Va.) IOO S. E. 400.
A transfer by the lessee of an estate less than his own, leaving a reversion in
himself, is a sublease. Stewart v. Long Island Ry. (1886) 1O2 N. Y. 6oi, 8
N. E. 2oo; St. Joseph & St. L. Ry. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. (1896) 135 Mo.
173, 36 S. W. 602. But a transfer of the lessee's entire interest in the whole
of the premises is an assignment. Craig v. Summers (i89i) 47 Minn. i89, 49
N. W. 742; Hogg v. Reynolds (igoi) 61 Neb. 758, 86 N. W. 479. In the absence
of a statute, a sublessee can maintain no action against the original lessor for
a breach of a covenant in the lease. Ganson. v. Tifft (1877) 71 N. Y. 48. And
he is not liable to the lessor on the covenants of the original lease. McFarlan
v. Watson (i85o) 3 N. Y. 286; Dunlap v. Bullard (I881) 131 Mass. 161. But
the assignee of a lease gets the benefits of any covenants of the original lease,
and can sue the lessor direct for any breach which occurs during the period of
his ownership. McClenahan v. Gwynn (i811, Va.) 3 Munf. 556; Cleveland C.
C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wood (igoi) 189 Ill. 352, 59 N. E. 61g. And he is liable to
the lessor for breaches of the lessee's covenants which occurred after the
assignment. Howland v. Coffin (1831) 29 Mass. 125; Salisbury v. Shirley
(1884) 66 Calif. 223, 5 Pac. 1O4. In the absence of a statutory prohibition or
of a provision in the lease to the contrary, a lessee is privileged to assign or to
sublet. Ray v. Johnson (1893) 98 Mich. 34, 56 N. W. 'O48; Crowe v. Riley
(igoo) 63 Oh. St. 1, 57 N. E. 956. But a provision of the lease expressly
denying the power to assign or sublet is valid. Indianapolis Manufacturing
Carpenters' Union v. Cleveland C. C. & L Ry. (1873) 45 Ind. 281; Shannon v.
Grundstaff (1895) II Wash. 536, 4o Pac. 123. However, restraints upon alien-
ation are strictly construed against the lessor. Hilsendegen v. Hartz Clothing
Co. (1911) i65 Mich. 255, 13o N. W. 646; Burns v. Dufresne (1912) 67 Wash.
158, 121 Pac. 46; see (1920) 29 YALE LAw JoURNAL, 360. Accordingly, a
subletting is not a breach of a covenant not to assign. Hargrave v. King (1848)
40 N. C. 43o; Moore v. Guardian Trust Co. (i9o3) 173 Mo. 218, 73 S. W. 143.
The instant case, in holding the converse, is in accord with the great weight of
authority. Lynde v. Hough (1857, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 27 Barb. 415; Burns v.
Dufresne (1912) 67 Wash. 158, 121 Pac. 46. And because of the substantial
differences between an assignment and a sublease, such a construction is sub-
mitted to be sound.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORcE-ANNULMENT-ALiMONY PENDENTE LITE AND COUNSEL
FEES-SuIT By RELATIVES OF DECEASED HUSBAND-The plaintiffs, relatives of a
deceased husband, sought to annul his marriage with the defendant under section
1747 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which allows a relative who has an interest
to avoid a marriage to sue for annulment on the ground of lunacy after the
death of the lunatic and during the life of the other spouse. The statute is
silent as to alimony and counsel fees. The defendant asked for alimony
pendente lite and counsel fees. An allowance was made by the lower court out
of a trust fund of which the deceased was the life-tenant, with remainder to
his heirs-at-law and next of kin, the trustee, however, not being a party to
this suit. Held (two judges dissenting), that alimony and counsel fees should
be denied. Farnham v. Farnham (1919, N. Y.) 124 N. E. 894.
The question of the allowance of alimony pendente lite and counsel fees to
the wife depends on whether the marriage was valid, and which party brings the
action. It is agreed by the courts that if it is admitted that the marriage is
void ab initio, temporary alimony and counsel fees will not be allowed. Sinclair
v. Sinclair (1898, Ct. Err.) 57 N. J. Eq. 222, 4o Atl. 679; Knott v. Knott (1902,
N. J. Ch.) 51 Atl. 15. Where the husband brings an action for annulment and
the wife insists that the marriage is valid, alimony pendente lite and counsel
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fees will be allowed on the theory that the marriage remains valid until the
court declares it invalid. Vroorn v. Marsh (1878, Ct. Err.) 29 N. J. Eq. 15;
North v. North (1845, N. Y.) I Barb. Ch. 241, 43 Amer. Dec. 778; Ricard v.
Ricard (igog) 143 Iowa, 182, 121 N. W. 525, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 5oo, note.
But where the action is brought by the wife, the majority of courts refuse to
allow her temporary alimony and counsel fees on the ground that the wife is
estopped to claim support by her allegations that the marriage is a nullity.
Bloodgood v. Bloodgood (188f, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 59 How. Prac. 42; Jones v.
Brinsmade (igo5) 183 N. Y. 258, 76 N. E. 22, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 192, note. A
very strong minority attacks this estoppel theory and allows alimony and counsel
fees to the wife where she institutes the suit. Allen v. Allen (188o, N. Y. Sup.
Ct.) 59 How. Prac. 27; Lea v. Lea (1889) 1O4 N. C. 603, 1O S. E. 488. The
request for alimony by the defendant in the instant case is novel because the
suit is brought after the death of the husband by his relatives. In an action
by a parent to annul the marriage of her infant son, alimony was not allowed
to the defendant, on the ground that the plaintiff was a stranger to the defendant
as far as alimony is concerned. Stivers v. Wise (1897) 18 App. Div. 316, 46
.N. Y. Supp. 9. Though the statute under which the suit in the principal case
was brought, does not provide for alimony, the court could have made com-
pliance with an order directing alimony a condition precedent to the decree of
annulment, since it was an equitable actio. The majority of the court argued,
however, that alimony is based on the duty of the husband to support his wife;
that the duty ceases on his death; and that the relatives being strangers to
the wife, there is no reason to make such a requirement. The dissent con-
tended that the action was more than a mere attempt to obtain property, since
it attacked defendant's status as a lawful wife and the legitimacy of her child
(But the Code of Civil Procedure allows the court to declare a child legitimate)
and the child's inheritance; and that therefore the relatives who made such
an attack in the hope of pecuniary gain should be subjected to the liability of
counsel fees, as the husband would be if he were alive and bringing the suit.
This argument seems very persuasive, though it is not clear how the order
directing the payment from the trust fund can be justified, the trustee not
being a party to the suit.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-RAILROAD CROSSINGS-LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE.-The
plaintiff owned certain lots on the Milwaukee side of a street, the center line
of which was the boundary between the town of Lake and the city of Milwaukee.
He brought this action to recover damages for the removal of soil occasioned
by cutting down the level of the street so as to make it run under the tracks
of the defendant's intersecting railroad. The city charter conferred power
on the city council "to require railroad companies to construct at their own
expense such bridges . . . tunnels, etc., at public railroad crossings as the
city council might deem necessary." The construction of the subway had been
authorized by an ordinance in which extended privileges were granted the rail-
road on condition that it construct several subway crossings of which this
was one. The ordinance expressly provided that the defendant "should be
at no cost or expense for any work outside of its right of way." Held, that
the plaintiff should recover. Application of Kaiser (1g9, Wis.) 174 N. W. 714.
The court found no difficulty with the claim of the plaintiff to damages, so
the only question was whether the city or the railroad was under a duty to
pay same. The decision rested entirely on the interpretation given to a similar
charter provision in a previous case. Superior v. Roemer (1913) 154 Wis. 345,
141 N. W. 250. The court there held that the charter provision gave the city
power to authorize construction only at the expense of the railroad and that
the city had no power to assume a duty to pay any part of the expense. That
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the decision in the principal case is based upon this denial of power is shown
by a similar case where the plaintiff who owned a lot on the other side of
the street, in the town of Lake, was not allowed to recover against the railroad.
Application of Doss (1gig, Wis.) 174 N. W. 718. In that case the supervisors
of the town had express power to make an agreement with railroad companies
to share in the expense of changing a grade crossing. The decision in the
principal case is sustained by authority. Northern Pacific Ry. v. State ex rel.
Duluth (19o8) 208 U. S. 583, 28 Sup. Ct. 341; State ex rel. Minneapolis v. St.
Paul M. & M. R. R. (igo6) 98 Minn. 380, io8 N. W. 261. The courts have
construed the power granted to municipal, as well as to private, corporations
strictly. See I McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (1911) sec. 353. Where no
power is granted none will be implied, unless it is necessary to support express
powers of the municipality. See Dailey v. City of New Haven (1891) 6o Conn.
314, 22 Atl. 945; Flannagan v. Buxton (igi) 145 Wis. 81, 129 N. W. 642.
There was no necessity in the instant case to imply a power to undertake a duty
to contribute to the expense, since the city by its express powers could compel
the railroad to construct the crossing at its own expense. Chicago, M. & St. P.
R. R. v. Fair Oaks (igog) 140 Wis. 334, 122 N. W. 81o; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R.
v. Nebraska (1897) 170 U. S. 57, 18 Sup. Ct. 513.
PLEADINC--MISNOMER ,OF PARTIs-AMENDMENTS.-The Michigan *Railway
Company leased its road to the Grand Trunk Railway Company, which company
operated it under the name of the Grand Trunk Railvay System. The plain-
tiff brought an action for injury to property against the Grand Trunk Railway
System. The service of summons was made on the Michigan Railway Company.
At the trial the attorney for the Grand Trunk Railway Company entered a
plea of the general issue on behalf of the Grand Trunk Railway System and,
after the plaintiff's evidence was all in, moved for a directed verdict, which
was granted. The plaintiff's motion to amend the pleadings by substituting
the name of the Grand Trunk Railway Company for the Grand Trunk Railway
System was refused. Held, that such refusal was correct, because a misnomer
of a defendant is not amendable where the intended defendant was not served
and did not make a general appearance. Parke, Davis & Co. v. Grand Trunk
Railway (1919, Mich.) 174 N. W. 145.
Where the cause of action remains the same, a misnomer of either party may
be amended, if service was made upon the intended party. Martin v. Martin
(1897) 95 Va. 26, 27 S. E. 81o; Maher v. Interstate Switch Co. (1897) 58 Kan.
817, 51 Pac. 286. By the weight of authority, a plaintiff may amend his action
so as to change the capacity in which he sues from individual to representative,
or vice versa. Johnson v. Phoenix Bridge Co. (gio) 197 N. Y. 316, 9o N. E.
953; Mann v. Marshall (1911) 76 N. H. 162, 8o AtI. 336. Contra, Lower v.
Segal (1897, Sup. Ct.) 6o N. J. L. 99, 36 Atl. 777; Walker v. Lansing Traction
Co. (igo6) 144 Mich. 685, io8 N. W. go. The defendant is likewise so privileged.
Hutchinson v. Tucker (1878) 124 Mass. 24o; Tighe v. Pope (1878, N. Y. Sup.
Ct.) 16 Hun, 18o. Similarly, an action brought by an individual may be changed
by an amendment into one by a partnership, or vice versa. Hodges v. Kimball
& Farnsworth (1878) 49 Iowa, 577; York v. Nash (19o3) 42 Ore. 321, 71 Pac.
59; contra, Blackwell v. Pennington & Sons (i88o) 66 Ga. 240. Also an
amendment charging defendants as partners instead of as a corporation may be
allowed. Haggerty v. Strong (i8g8) IO S. D. 585, 74 N. W. 1037; Teets v.
Snider Heading Mfg. Co. (9o5) 12o Ky. 653, 87 S. W. 803. The principle of the
instant case is clearly correct; but it would seem that the fact that the attorney
who entered the plea was the general attorney for the Grand Trunk Company,
and that the Grand Trunk Company operated under the name of the Grand
Trunk System, which did not exist as a corporation, would be sufficient to
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establish a primna facie agency for this particular action between this attorney
and the company, and thus constitute a general appearance for the company.
A general appearance cures all defects in service where the court would have
had jurisdiction if the service had been perfect. Rednond v. Peterson (1894)
io2 Calif. 595, 36 Pac. 923; Baker v. Union Stock Yards Nat. Bank (192o) 63
Neb. 8oi, 89 N. W. 269.
PLEADING-WRONGFUL DEATH-STATUTORY PERIOD-CONDITION PRECEDENT OR
LIMITATION PERIoD.-Suit was brought November 28, I9IO, under a wrongful
death statute requiring that action thereon must be brought within one year
after the death. The declaration alleged that the injury resulting in death
occurred June 27, 19o9, but did not allege the date of the death, nor that the
action was commenced within one year after the death. Held, that the declara-
tion did not state a cause of action. Hartray v. Chicago Railways (i919, Ill.)
124 N. E. 849.
One line of cases holds that a statutory requirement of this sort is a limita-
tion period to be set up in the defendant's pleading. Sharrow v. Inland Lines,
Ltd. (1915) 214 N. Y. 1oi, io8 N. E. 217; Chiles v. Drake (1859, Ky.) 2
Met. 146, 74 Amer. Dec. 406. But most courts treat such a provision as a
limitation or condition attached to the right. De Martino v. Sieman. (1916)
9o Conn. 527, 97 Atl. 765; Korb v. Bridgeport Gas Light Co. (1917) 91 Conn.
395, 99 Atl. 1048; The Harrisburg (1886) 119 U. S. 199, 7 Sup. Ct. 140; Bos-
ton and Maine R. R. v. Hurd (1goi, C. C. A. Ist) io8 Fed. 116, 47 C. C. A. 615;
Hamilton v. Hannibal and St. Joseph R. R. (1888) 39 Kan. 56, I8 Pac. 57.
These cases reason since there is no action at common law for wrongful death,
then where a statute creates a right of action, a limitation in the statute is
inherently a part of the right of action. In this respect the limitation differs
from the ordinary statute of limitations, which operates to bar a preexisting
right. See Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act (2d ed. 1913) sec. 121. According
to this view, in order to avail himself of the right, a plaintiff must affirmatively
allege that his action was commenced within the period provided. Louisville
and Nashville R. R. v. Chamblee (i9io) 171 Ala. 188, 54 So. 681. When the
plaintiff fails to do this, his declaration is demurrable. Lapsley, Admtx. v.
Public Service Corporation of New Jersey (19o8, Sup. Ct.) 75 N. J. L. 266,
68 Atl. 1113. The principal case follows the majority rule, and is sound in
result. For the effect of a foreign statute of limitations, see (1918) 27 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, o178.
PROCEDURE-SERVICE BY PUBLICATION-IDEM SONAN.-The plaintiff sued to
foreclose his mortgage on the defendant's property, service in the suit being
by publication. The defendant contended that the court failed to obtain
jurisdiction because of defective notice. The published notice named the
defendant as "Asa W. Winegar," whereas his name was "Aseph W. Winegar."
There was evidence that he had frequently been called "Asa" and that his
name so appeared in the previous directory. Held, that there was not sufficient
variation in the sound of the two names to make the service void. Bennett v.
Winegar (i919, Neb.) 174 N.' W. 512.
The courts are practically unanimous in applying the doctrine of idem sonans
when called upon to determine the validity of default judgments rendered upon
personal service. Bloomfield R. R. v. Burress (1882) 8z Ind. 83; Walsh v.
Kirkpatrick (1866) 3o Calif. 22. But where service was made by publication,
there is considerable conflict of opinion as to whether or not the doctrine
should be applied. The more recent authorities tend to support the principal
case. Cf. Puckett v. Hetzer (i91o) 82 Kan. 726, 1o9 Pac. 285; cf. Davison
v. Bankers' Life Ass'n (1912) 166 Mo. App. 625, 150 S. W. 713. Contra,
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Hubner v. Reickhoff (1897) 1O3 Iowa, 368, 72 N. W. 540; Schoenfeld v.
Bourne (igog) 159 Mich. 139, 123 N. W. 537. In general, the decisions contra
are based on the ground that since such service was unknown to the common
law and depends entirely on statutory provisions, power so granted must be
strictly construed. Where notice was had by publication in proceedings to
sell real estate for taxes, there is still greater tendency not to apply the doctrine.
Cf. Emeric v. Alvarado (1891) 9o Calif. 444, 27 Pac. 356; cf. Myers v. DeLisle
(1914) 259 Mo. 5o6, 168 S. W. 676. A reasonable way to settle the problem
is to determine from the circumstances in each case, whether a reasonable man
would have been put on notice by reading the publication. A recent case adopted
substantially this view. Ordean v. Grannis (1912) 118 Minn. 117, 136 N. W.
575. It was there held that if the names when printed looked sufficiently alike
to the eye, so that neither the defendant nor those who knew him could be
misled, the service would be valid, although the true name and the name given
were not strictly idem sonans.
PROPERTY-ESCHEAT-CONFLICT OF LAws.-One Forney died intestate in Cali-
fornia, of which state he was a'resident, leaving deposits in banks in Nevada.
The public administrator of Nevada reported no heirs and recommended the
escheat of the property to that state. An illegitimate daughter of the decedent,
who had always lived in California, then applied for the property on the ground
that according to the law of Nevada she had been legitimated. Held, that she
had no right to the estate, because her legitimation was governed by the law
of California, under which she could not inherit. Sanders, J., dissenting.
In re Forney's Estate (igig, Nev.) 184 Pac. 2o6.
One Clifford died intestate in Minnesota, leaving personal property in North
Dakota. The administrator reported that the two surviving sisters were
unlocated, and that the state should receive the whole property by escheat.
The probate court decreed accordingly. The sisters then appeared and secured
a modification of the decree, and applied to the State Treasurer, trustee of
the fund, to have it turned over .to them. He refused and they sued him and
the state. Held, that they should recover. Delaney v. State (1919, N. D.)
174 N. W. 290.
Escheat is now principally regulated by statute. By the feudal theory of
common law, when a man died intestate without inheritable blood the estate
vested in the state at once by operation of law. See 4 Kent, Commentaries
(I3th ed. 1884) 424; 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 382, note. As indicated in the note
last cited, however, some courts with a more modern view made a judicial
proceeding necessary before the state could vest title in itself or its grantee.
This was later accomplished by statute in some jurisdictions, among them North
Dakota, California, and Nevada, as is seen in the principal case. This seems
the correct solution even without a statute, since in modern times the state
does not take by succession, but by want of succession, by complete failure of
title. If in fact there are neither heirs nor kindred, the death of the intestate
is the operative fact which gives the state the right that his property shall
escheat. But there appears no reason why the state should not' be required
to vindicate its right at law, like one who is heir-at-law. See io R. C. L. 6og ff.
It is to be noted that the fiction as to the situs of personal property is dispensed
with in the case of escheat, which is the usual result when that fiction conflicts
with the law of the state wherein the property is situated. See Beale, The
Situs of Things (19ig) 28 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 525, 528.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANIES-TELEGRAPES-SENDER'S CONTRACT AS BINDING
RECEIvER-The defendant company received the following message for trans-
mission. "Prospects look higher for hogs selling fifty-five to-day." The mes-
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sage was sent "unrepeated" and subject to the usual limitations of liability on
the part of the company on such messages, i. e., damages to be limited to the
amount paid for transmission and notice of claims to be filed within sixty days.
When received by the plaintiff, the addressee, it read "ninety-five" instead of
"fifty-five." He sought to recover the damages resulting. Held, that he should
recover full damages. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hanlen (1919, Ind.
App.) 125 N. E. 45.
The damages recoverable by a sendee for misdelivery or nondelivery of a
telegram necessarily depends in the first instance on the court's view as to the
effect of the compariy's fault on the relations of sender and sendee. See
(1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1091, 932. But it has been held, as in the principal
case, that since the rights of the sendee of a telegram arise in tort, out of a
breach of public duty on the part of the company, they have no connection
with the contract made by-the sender with the company. See (1917) 26 ibid.,
252; Webbe v. Western Union (1897) 169 Ill. 610, 48 N. E. 670; Pacific Tele-
graph Co. v. Underwood (1893) 37 Neb. 315, 55 N. W. 1057. Most jurisdictions,
however, limit the secondary duty of the company to pay damages to the terms
of the contract made by it with the sender. Some base this limitation on the
ground that the rights of the receiver arise as those of a third party bene-
ficiary of the contract and must be limited to its terms. Manier v. Western
Union (18gi) 94 Tenn. 442, 29 S. W. 732; Stone & Co. v. Postal (91o) 31
R. I. 174, 76 AtI. 762. A better view is held by those courts which admit that
the company is under a public duty analogous to that of a common carrier, but
maintain that the contract made by the sender, to the extent that its provisions
have been held to be reasonable and not contrary to public policy, limits the
duty which the law imposes on the company to the public. Broom v. Western
UniOn (195o) 71 S. C. 5o6, 51 S. E. 259; Western Union v. Dant (914) 42
D. C. App. 398. The effect of the decision in the principal case is to render
all the provisions of limited liability null and void as regards the receiver. While
in a technical sense the addressee did not deal with the company in fixing the
terms of the service, the company did in fact serve both sender and addressee.
If the terms of that service are reasonable as regards one party, there is no
reason why they are not reasonable as regards the other. According to the
principal case the company is under a far greater liability to the public than it
is to its patrons. It is difficult to believe that public utilities commissions which
pass on the reasonableness of the terms of these contracts could have intended
that result.
QUASI-CONTRAcTs-TAxES PAID UNDFR VOID STATUTE-REcOVERY AGAINST
TAX CoLLEcTOR.-The plaintiff paid, under protest, taxes to the defendant state
treasurer according to the provisions of a state statute. This statute, which
provided drastic" penalties for non-payment, was later declared unconstitutional.
The defendant had already paid the amount collected into the state treasury.
The plaintiff then brought this action against the defendant personally to
recover the money paid in response to his demands. Held, that recovery should
be allowed. International Paper Co. v. Burrill (1919, D. Mass.) 260 Fed. 664.
Generally the payment of an illegal tax, under protest but with full knowl-
edge of the facts and without any duress, cannot be recovered by the taxpayer.
Brunson v. Board of Directors (1913) io7 Ark. 24, 153 S. W. 828; see Ann.
Cas. 1915A 495, note. Much diversity of opinion exists as to what sets of
circumstances fulfill the "duress" requirement. See Woodward, Quasi-Con-
tracts (1913) ch. 17; Thurston, Cases it Quasi Contract (1916) 548. A pay-
ment of an illegal tax made under an immediate and urgent necessity in order
to protect the person or property of the payor is deeined duress. Wheeler v.
Plumas County (19o6) 149 Calif. 782, 87 Pac. 802. Some courts hold there
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is no duress until some actual measures are taken to enforce collection. Miner
v. Clifton Toznship (1912) 30 S. D. 127, 137 N. W. 585. But it has often been
held, as in the instant case, that a payment, under protest, of an illegal tax
to avoid the accrual of heavy penalties for delay is duress, though no pro-
ceedings have been taken or threatened. Atchison, etc., Ry. v. O'Connor (1911)
223 U. S. 280, 32 Sup. Ct..216; Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain
(1917) 92 Conn. 199, io2 Atl. 6oo. To hold otherwise would mean a costly
impediment to business, since such payments are practically compulsory.
Because suit could not be maintained against the state, recovery was sought
in the principal case against the collector. And a state official who has com-
mitted an unconstitutional act under color of authority from the state is not
shielded by the state's immunity from suit. See Nevada, etc., Co. v. Hamilton
(i916, D. Nev.) 235 Fed. 317, 322. So taxes invalidly assessed and paid, as
in the instant case, are recoverable if the collector understands the payor regards
them as illegal. Erskine v. Van Arsdale (1872, U. S.) 15 Wall. 75; Atchison,
etc., Ry. v. O'Connor, supra. Otherwise the plaintiff would be remediless,
whereas the collector will usually be reimbursed by statute or appropriation.
WILLS-INTERPRETATION- "LEGAL HEms AND NEXT OF KIN"--GIFT OF RE-
MAINDER-The testatrix gave her residuary estate in trust to her son for life,
and at his death to be distributed "among my legal heirs and next of kin who
shall be by law entitled to the same as though I died intestate." Held, that the
nephews and nieces of the testatrix took the corpus of the estate to the exclu-
sion of the son's widow. Oleson v. Somogyi (1919, N. J. Ch.) io7 At. 798.
The tisual rule is that unless the testator has otherwise indicated, one is not
excluded from taking a remainder as heir because also named as the life tenant.
Re Wilson [19o7] I Ch. 450, [1907] 2 Ch. 572; Thomas v. Castle (19o4) 76 Conn.
447, 56 Atl. 854; Ford v. Ford (1915) 220 Mass. 322, 1O7 N. E. 948; Bache's
Estate (1914) 246 Pa. St. 276, 92 Atl. 3o4. But see Wilde v. Bell (1913) 86 Conn.
61o, 87 Atl. 8. As stated in the principal case, "the natural presumption is over-
come by the legal presumption which arises from the use of technical words."
A protracted attempt upon the part of a life tenant to terminate a trust in her
favor by invoking this rule was unsuccessful. Ackerman v. Union & New
Haven Trust Co. (1915) 9o Conn. 63, 96 Atl. i4g; (1917) 91 Conn. 5o0, O Atl. 22.
In the principal case, the court quite properly was astute in discovering an inten-
tion other than that presumed under the technical rule, though its result hardly
accords with Re Wilson, supra. The court relied mainly upon the discretion
given to the son's trustees to use from the corpus, a provision unnecessary if he
was to take as sole heir; on the use of the word "shall" in connection with
heirs as indicating an intention that heirs should be ascertained at the son's,
rather than at the death of the testatrix (sed quaere, in view of the expression
"entitled to the same as though I died intestate"); and on the direction for
distribution "among" the heirs, which showed that more than one person was
contemplated.
WoRKMEN's COMPENSATION ACT-ACCIDENTAL VIOLENCE TO PHYSICAL STRUC-
TURE-RUPTURE CAUSED BY VOMITING.-One Clark was employed by the defend-
ant company as a night watchman. He was found dead in the company's mine
one morning, with his clothes on fire. The referee found that his death was
caused by a rupture of the aorta due to "an extra effort in vomiting," and
that the vomiting was due to either noxious gases, the smell of his burning
clothes or fright at discovering that his clothes were burning. It was also
found that he was syphilitic; that, while he might have lived four 6r five years,
he was susceptible to a rupture of the aorta and might have died at any time.
Clark's wife sued for compensation for his death. Held, that she should
recover. Clark v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. (1919, Pa.) 107 Atl. 858.
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The fact that an employee was under a physical disability when injured does
not prevent recovery under most statutes, even if the injury could not have
happened but for the disability. Bell v. Hayes-lonia Co. (x916) 192 Mich. go,
158 N. W. i79; see (1918) 28 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 98. Nor, in general, does
the fact that a previous disability is responsible for the serious nature or length
of the illness resulting from the injury prevent recovery for the whole period.
Hills v. Oval Wood Dish Co. (ig6) 191 Mich. 411, 158 N. W. 214. Likewise,
even if the effect of the injury was only to accelerate slightly the operation of
natural causes which would in any case have incapacitated the employee. Peoria
Ry. Terminal Co. v. Industrial Board (1917) 279 Ill. 352, 116 N. E. 651; 'but
-see (1917) 27 YALE LANW JOURNAL, 578. So also in England. Hughes v. Clover,
Clayton and Co. Ltd. (19o9, C. A.) 2 K. B. 798. The rule in most jurisdictions
seems to be that where the "injury" was in any way a cause-where the
incapacity or death would not have occurred at that time and place without it-
the fact that there were other causes is immaterial. The court in the instant
case was certainly safe in ruling that the mere existence of another cause, the
syphilitic condition of the employe, did not necessarily preclude recovery. In
Pennsylvania it is not necessary that the injury arise "out of" the employment.
Pa. Laws, 1915, sec. 2Ol; Lane v. Hornt & Hardart Baking Co. (igi8) 261 Pa.
329, 1O4 At. 615. So the court ruled that, irrespective of anterior causes, the
rupture was such "accidental violence to the physical structure of the body"
as was provided for by the statute. It was not therefore necessary to find that
anyone of the three anterior causes suggested by the report, or any other cause
arising out of the employment, was responsible for the injury. Here the case
was distinguished from these minority courts which hold that if the immediate
cause of the incapacity is a disease, there can be no recovery, even if that
disease is itself the result of conditions of the employment. See (1917) 27
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 144. In regarding the immediate cause of the injury-an
effect of anterior causes-the court has failed to recognize that accidents are
marked essentially by the nature of their anterior causes-a'fall, rather than a
disease-and not necessarily by their effects-a rupture, rather than a less
violent death. The effect of the interpretation is that it is not now necessary in
Pennsylvania to find any cause in any way connected with the conditions of the
employment. In most jurisdictions this is necessary. Kimbal v. Industrial
Accident Commission (1916) 173 Calif. 351, i6o Pac. 15o. Under the present
Pennsylvania rulings, the conclusion is now logically necessary that if an
employee dies suddenly at any time during his employment, as a result of a
preexisting disease, the employer must give compensation. Yet the court
disavows any intention so to rule. See also McCauley v. Imperial W. Co.
(1918) 261 Pa. 312, 328, 104 Atl. 617, 622. And it must be recognized that such
a result would be compulsory insurance of employes by employers. See Corwvin,
Social Insurance and Constitutional Limitations (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
431.
